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RECENT DECISIONS
of the commissioners, held that it would be "plain defiance" of the Penal Code
to inject the common law limitation as to time. Section 241 of the Penal Code of
New York is essentially like Section 340.01 of the Wisconsin Statutes (1933);
neither prescribes any limiting period of time between the inflicting of the fatal
wound and the resulting death.
A situation similar to the instant case has never been presented to the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. It is submitted that Wisconsin may follow the
New York ruling. The common law rule was a safeguard in the past which is
no longer necessary. The certainty with which modem medical science can trace
the efficient cause of the death removes the reason for the common law rule.
HUGH V. GwiN.
LABOR UNIONS-WISCONSIN LABOR CODE-EMPLOYER RESTRAINED FROM INTER-
FERING WITH UNIONIZATION AcTIviTis.-Plaintiff, a Wisconsin labor union, al-
leging that several hundred of its members are employees of the defendant
company and that it is actively engaged in an attempt to procure additional mem-
bers among the employees of the defendant, sought to restrain the defendant
from further interfering with the exercise of asserted rights of its employees.
The alleged rights were: full freedom of association, self-organization, and the
designation of representatives of their own choosing, to negotiate the terms and
conditions of their employment free from the interference, restraint or coercion
of the employer or its agents, in the designation of such representatives or in
self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. Wis. Stats. (1933) § 268.18. The
alleged interference was that the defendant refused to deal with the outside
representative of the union, informed its employees that it would not recognize
the union or deal with outside parties and threatened a shut-down if the em-
ployees persisted in their union demands. The National Industrial Recovery Act,
48 Stat. 198 (1933), 15 U.S.C.A. 707 (a) (famed section 7a), the President's
Reemployment Agreement and the Wisconsin Statutes, Wis. Stats. (1933) §
133.07 (1) and § 268.18 et. seq. (Wisconsin Labor Code) were alleged to have
been violated. The lower court overruled a demurrer and after a hearing granted
a temporary injunction, basing its decision on the N.I.R.A. and P.R.A. (1934)
32 Mich. L. Rev. 270. On Appeal. Held, that the complaint states a cause of action
under the Wisconsin Statutes, Wis. Stats. (1933) § 133.07 and § 268.18, and the
findings are sufficient under the Wisconsin Labor Code, Wis. Stats. (1933) §
268.19 et seq. to sustain the injunction. Trustees of Wisconsin State Federation
of Labor v. Simplex Shoe Mfg. Co., (Wis., 1934) 256 N.W. 56.
The court stated that Section 268.18, Wis. Stat., supra was a deliberate dec-
laration of labor's rights. It compared this section with the Norris-La Guardia
Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. 102, and found them to be strikingly similar.
The Norris-La Guardia Act, however, does not attempt to broaden, limit or
define the rights of either employer or employee. Its sole purpose seems to be to
regulate, define and limit the power of Federal Courts in labor disputes. See,
Cinderella Theatre Co. v. Sign Writers Local Union, 6 F. Supp. 164, 166 (E.D.
Mich., 1934). In cases involving the Norris-LaGuardia Act, either Section 7.
of N.I.R.A., supra, or the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C.A.
152 (3), have been relied upon as defining labor's rights. Myers et al. v. Lodisi-
ana & A. Ry. Co., 7 F. Supp. 92 (W.D. Louisiana, 1933) (invoking Railway
Labor Act) ; International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving
Picture Machine Operators Local v. Rex Theatre Corp., (C.C.A. 7th. Oct. 24,
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1934) ; Stanley et al. v. Peabody Coal Co., 5 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Ill. 1933) (invok-
ink Section 7a of N.I.R.A.). It is difficult to see how comparison between the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Wisconsin Labor Code lends the Court authority
for holding that section 268.18 is a declaration of labor's rights. The comparison
instead tends to create doubt as to the constitutionality of the Wisconsin Labor
Code. State bills modelled after the Norris-LaGuardia Act have been deemed un-
constitutional. In re Opinion of the Justices, (N.H. 1933) 166 Atl. 640 (invading
rights of personal liberty and property under 14th Amendment, discriminatory,
depriving Courts of inherent power) ; Opinion of the Justices, 275 Mass. 580,
176 N.E. 649 (1931) (depriving persons of property without due process, limit-
ing power of courts); cf. Thoe v. Chicago M. & St. Paul R. Co., 181 Wis. 456,
195 N.W. 407 (1923) (legislative limitation on judicial powers of Circuit Courts
Held unconstitutional) ; see John F. Jelke Co. v. Beck, 208 Wis. 650, 660, 242 N.W.
576, 580 (1932) ; Legis. (1934) 9 Wis. L. Rev. 278, 284.
Section 268.18, if a valid declaration of labor's rights, does not give rise to
any greater rights than Section 7a. Cf. Section 109.04 (2a), Laws of Wisconsin
(1933) Chap. 476 (The "7a" of the Wisconsin Act for Emergency Promotion of
Industrial Recovery). Doubt as to the practical advantages accruing to labor
under Section 7a has been expressed. Comment (1934) 43 Yale L.J. 625; cf.
Note (1933) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 85, 118; (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 712. But in Wis-
consin, as a result of Section 7a and its interpretation by the National Labor
Board, labor unionization has made more progress than in any other State.
Lacher, Rule by Riot, The Iron Age (Oct. 1934); Kohler, Interpreting Section
7a with Bricks, Nations Business (Nov. 1934). The interpretation in the instant
case placed on the words "interference, restraint or coercion" imputes to them
a meaning favorable to labor. A refusal to bargain with the chosen representa-
tive comes within their purview and being unlawful may be restrained. Trustees
of Wisconsin State Federation of Labor v. Simplex Shoe Mfg. Co., supra;
Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Co., 114 N.J. Eq. 462, 168 Ati. 862 (1933).
Contra: H. B. Rosenthal v. Ettlinger Co. v. Echlossberg, et al., 149 Misc. 210,
266 N.Y.S. 762 (1933) (refusal to bargain is not a violation of Section 7a);
cf. Durable Sportswear Co. v. Helliman, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 13, 1933, at 8 (Sup. Ct.).
But the decision leaves open the question of whether refusing to accept the prof-
ferred terms of the employee's chosen representative amounts to a refusal to
bargain [discussed in McNatt, Organized Labor and the Recovery Act (1933-4)
32 Mich. L. Rev. 780; cf. Sargent, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining under
Section 7 (a) 29 Ill. L. Rev. 275, 295 (1934)]. Should that question be decided in
the negative the injunction is worthless to labor. If it be decided in the affirma-
tive, labor would virtually become the dictator.
The Wisconsin court hopes that capital and labor will deal justly, fairly,
and considerately with each other. This can not result from having the courts
vaguely, abstractly and broadly define and allegedly uphold the respective rights
of capital and labor. The solution seems to lie in the formation within an indus-
try of codes created by the joint action of both parties and containing concrete
and specific determinations of the relationships between them. Note (1933) 47
Harv. L. Rev. 85,125.
GERRIT D. FOSTER.
PARENT AND CHILD-ADOPTION STATUTES-RIGHT OF ADOPTED CHILD TO IN-
HERIT FROM NATURAL PARENTS.-A and B, natural children of an intestate
decedent, are claimants to the estate. B, when eight years of age, was legally
adopted by X. A claims as sole heir, contending that B has lost the status of
